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method	might	be	 inappropriate	 for	 the	 epistemic	 task.	Method	mis-
match	 likely	occurs	due	to	method	bias:	 tacit	or	explicit	 ideas	about	
knowledge-production	might	influence	scientific	practice.	Our	target,	
then,	 is	 how	 opinions	 about	 good	method	 in	 a	 scientific	 communi-
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We’ll	 analyse	 and	 explore	 method	 plurality,	 mismatch,	 and	 bias,	
























through	 a	 commitment	 to	method	pluralism	 and	 a	 recognition	 that	
some	methods	are	more	useful	 in	some	contexts	 than	others.	 In	do-




cal	 analysis	 which	 approaches	 evidence	 abstracted	 from	 aspects	 of	
epistemic	 situations	—	community	 standards	 in	particular	—	are	 inad-
equate	for	many	instances	of	knowledge	generation	in	science.
evidence.	 In	 light	 of	 this,	we’ll	 characterize	 two	 scientific	 strategies,	
one	targeting	sharpness	—	methodological	“obligates”	—	and	the	other	
targeting	independence:	methodological	“omnivores”.	We’ll	then	con-
sider	 under	what	 conditions	method	mismatch	 could	 occur,	 explor-










funding	decisions,	 the	opinions	of	 referees,	and	so	 forth	affect	what	







epistemic	 situation,	 into	 account,	 is	wrong-headed.	 Indeed:	we’ll	 ar-
gue	that	consideration	of	such	community	properties	 is	required	for	
understanding	evidence.
In	 addition	 to	 these	 points	 about	 the	 social	 epistemology	 of	 sci-
ence,	we	also	take	ourselves	to	be	making	a	contribution	to	discussion	
of	how	we	should	understand	and	make	optimal	epistemic	progress,	
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Sharpness	 is	best	understood	probabilistically.	Evidence	 is	 sharp	
vis-à-vis a	hypothesis	 to	 the	extent	 to	which	the	unconditional	prob-





sible	 that	many	experimental	 strategies	 aim	 to	maximize	 sharpness	
(consider	 Cleland	 2002,	 Currie	 &	 Levy	 forthcoming,	 for	 instance).	
Controlling	 for	 confounding	 factors	 lowers	 ambiguity;	 the	 results	
exclude	more	possibilities.	Multiple	runs,	controlled	conditions,	and	
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overlapping	background	theory,	then	a	single	mistake	can	lead	to	the	
failure	 of	 both.	 Independence	 is	 graded:	 some	 measures	 will	 have	
more	or	 less	overlapping	 justification.	And,	 indeed,	overlaps	can	be	
more	 or	 less	 problematic	 depending	 on	how	firmly	 established	 the	
overlapping	theory	is.	Although	independence	is	in	principle	a	virtue,	
it	 is	 important	to	note	its	 in-practice	limitations.	Evidence	generated	
from	 different	 procedures	 can	 be	 incongruent:	 background	 theory	 is	
required	 to	 “translate”	between	evidence	generated	by	different	pro-




Nancy	 Cartwright	 (2007)	 makes	 a	 related	 evidential	 distinction,	







only	a	very	 specialized	 type	of	evidence	as	 input	and	 special	 forms	
















past	 temperature.	Surface	 temperature	fluctuations	 in	 the	deep	past	






evidence	 for	 free:	 borehole	 temperature	must	 be	 controlled	 against	







pattern	 of	 past	 temperature. Because	 the	 evidence	 relies	 on	 differ-
ent	bodies	of	 background	 theory,	 for	 the	world	 to	 refuse	 to	 cooper-
ate	—	that	is,	for	the	convergent	predictions	to	turn	out	false	—	distinct	
failures	are	required.	If	temperature	estimates	from	both	borehole	and	
pollen	 data	 converge,	 but	 those	 estimations	 are	 false,	 separate	mis-
takes	 are	 required	 for	 each	 source.	 Perhaps	 our	method	 for	 pollen-
gathering	 introduces	bias;	perhaps	 interior	warming	 in	our	analysis	
of	 borehole	 data	 was	 faulty.	 In	 this	 circumstance,	 the	 convergence	
would	be	a,	perhaps	very	unlikely,	coincidence.	 Independence,	then,	

























there	are	other	ways	 to	go	within	a	Bayesian	 framework,	and	subtleties	 to	
how	one	 formalises	 it	with	 respect	 to	different	measures	of	evidential	 sup-
port	 (Fitelson	 2001).	We	 take	 independence	 to	 be	 a	 relationship	 between	
two	 (or	more)	 instances	of	evidence	 (E1	and	E2)	and	a	hypothesis	 (H)	 for	












the	different	data	 and	 the	hypothesis	 are	 independent	of	 each	other,	 such	
that	 a	 fault	 in	 one	would	 not	 undermine	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 other;	 for	 in-








below,	we	 think	our	approach	 to	modelling	 independence	 (and	 sharpness,	
for	 that	 matter)	 handles	 the	 majority	 of	 approaches	 to	 precisifying	 these	
notions.
Consider	 two	situations.	 In	situation	1,	we	are	trying	to	establish	




data	 set	D.	Given	background	knowledge,	we	know	 that	 if	 the	data	


































terns	 themselves,	and	 less	direct	evidence	 from	a	variety	of	 sources	






Third,	 defenders	 of	 Evidence-Based	Medicine	 are	 plausibly	 read	
as	demanding	sharpness,	and	denying	the	value	of	independence,	in	
the	 context	 of	 approving	medicinal	 treatments.	On	 such	 views,	 the	
best	evidence	(sometimes,	in	effect,	the	only	admissible	evidence)	for	
proving	 the	 effectiveness	of	 a	 treatment	 is	 a	 randomised	 controlled	
trial	and,	ideally,	a	meta-analysis	of	such	trials.	These	are	contrasted	
with	anecdotal,	narrative,	and	lab-based	mechanistic	types	of	evidence	
which	are	 considered	 less	 important.	Others	 respond	 that	medicine	
would	do	better	to	take	a	“total	evidence	view”,	including	these	other	
evidence	sources	in	approving	medical	treatments	(for	general	discus-








which	might	make	a	difference	 to	 such	debates.	 First,	 there	 is	what	
we’ll	 call	 “evidential	 context”	—	understood	 narrowly	 as	 concerning	
In	 our	 model,	 we	 will	 distinguish	 between	 two	 scientific	 strate-
gies:	 one	 attempts	 to	maximize	 sharpness,	 the	 other	 independence.	











instance,	 the	 introduction	 to	Diamond	&	Robinson	2010,	as	well	as	
Turner	2007).	 In	 light	of	 this,	 the	extent	 to	which	one	can	rely	on	a	
single	or	a	few	sources	of	evidence	dramatically	diminishes:	scientists	
instead	 adopt	 a	 “variety-of-reasoning”	 strategy	which	 seeks	 to	maxi-










Bausman	 &	 Halina	 forthcoming),	 “neutral	 theorists”	 complain	 that	
ecological	 methodologies	 which	 focus	 on	 competition	 models	 are	
epistemically	inadequate,	because	they	lack	the	crucial	tests	provided	
by	 null	models.	 They	 argue	 that	models	 without	 competition	 (neu-
tral	models)	should	be	used	to	test	competition	models.	Competition	
13.	 The	obligate/omnivore	distinction	is	adapted	from	Currie	(2015,	2018).
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reasonable,	the	model	is	not	predictive.	Nonetheless,	in	the	best	sce-







co-opts	 landscape	 models	 from	 evolutionary	 biology.14	 A	 standard	




ing	 to	various	rules.	 In	evolutionary	 landscapes,	agents	are	 typically	
“hill-climbers”,	shifting	from	lower	to	higher	locations	on	the	grid.	This	
is	 useful	 for	 representing,	 for	 instance,	 local	 fitness	 traps:	 an	 agent	
may	reach	local	optima	but,	due	to	“valleys”,	be	unable	to	reach	higher	
ground.15






















scientists	approve	of	what	 they	do,	and	how	 they	progress,	 is	not	a	
simple	matter	of	considering	the	appropriate	strategy	given	an	eviden-
tial	context.	Social	factors	matter	—	crucially	—	as	well.
3. Modelling Method Pluralism
Here	is	not	the	place	for	a	full	defence	of	the	use	of	agent-based	mod-














are	 taken	 to	 be	 exemplary	 characteristics,	 the	model	 concretises	 by	
assigning	numerical	parameters	to	what	are	taken	to	be	key	processes.
In	 the	 design	 of	 the	model,	 the	 usefulness	 of	 the	 concretisation	
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ods	 are,	 the	more	 independent	 their	 evidence	outputs	will	 be	 from	
each	other,	 i.e.	 less	 shared	background	 theory	goes	 into	 linking	 the	
evidence	streams	to	a	hypothesis.19	The	basic	idea	is	that	obligate	and	
omnivore	 agents	 pursue	 research	 programs	preferring	 sharpness	 or	







sharp	 evidence	 is	 the	way	 to	 go,	while	 another	—	omnivores	—	seek	
out	independence.20	Our	model	captures	a	set	of	minimal	conditions	
for	when	 two	different	 features	of	 evidence	might	matter	within	an	






hold	 for	 any	 conceptualisation	 of	 independence	 that	 allows	 associating	 a	











sources	 and	 a	hypothesis	 set	 to	 a	 degree	of	 confirmation	 for	 the	best-sup-
ported	hypothesis	in	the	set	f2 ({e},{h})→c(hbest).	In	our	model	we	cash	these	
out	 in	 terms	of	 sharpness	 and	 independence	 respectively,	but	our	 simulation	





In	 our	 case,	we’re	 interested	 in	 a	 different	 set	 of	 questions:	 first,	
the	relationship	between	epistemic	situation	and	evidence-gathering	









the	 overlap	 between	 background	 theory	 which	 underwrites	 meth-
ods	—	that	is,	independence.
A	 common	 criticism	 of	 existing	 epistemic	 landscape	 models	 is	
that	 neither	 height	 of	 individual	 points	 on	 the	 landscape	 nor	 dis-
tance	between	points	on	 the	 landscape	have	 rigorous	philosophical	
underpinnings.16	 In	our	model,	both	of	 these	parameters	are	clearer.	
Each	 parameter	 (height	 and	 distance)	maps	 directly	 to	 the	 goals	 of	




a	 specified	 (x, y)	 coordinate,	 as	 representing	 a	method	 of	 data	 gen-
eration,	and	of	landscape	“height”	(Z axis)	as	evidence	sharpness:	the	
higher	the	point,	 the	sharper	the	evidence	produced	by	the	method,	
given	 background	 knowledge.	 Distance	 in	 the	 landscape	—	on	 the	
X,	Y	plane	—	represents	 independence:18	 the	 further	 apart	 two	meth-
16.	 See	criticism	of	current	 lack	of	 solid	 foundations	 in	Avin	(2015),	ch.	2.	See	
Avin	(2015),	ch.	3,	for	an	attempt	to	provide	such	a	foundation.






















to	 some	 fraction	of	 the	potential	 value.	By	 “generating”	 (see	below),	
agents	can	increase	the	exploitable	landscape	to	above	the	initial	ac-










tween	genotypes;	 in	epistemic	models,	 similarity	between	 investiga-
tions	or	 techniques.	But	 in	what	 sense	are	genotypes	or	 techniques	

















The	model	 is	evolutionary:	after	set	 time	periods,	 the	ratio	of	ob-









landscape	 topography,	 agent	 strategies,	 and	 publication	 thresholds	
that	 consistently	 result	 in	 landscapes	where	both	obligates	 and	om-
nivores	survive	in	dynamic	equilibrium	near	a	50%/50%	population	
split.	We	 used	 these	 parameter	 configurations	 to	 establish	 “neutral”	
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Exploration







































ing	 from	distance,	 a	 two-way	 relationship,	 to	an	N-way	 relationship,	
we	measure	the	independence	of	a	set	of	methods	as	the	area	of	the	
polygon	bounding	 the	coordinates	corresponding	 to	 these	methods.	
An	important	variable	regarding	distance	is	the	clustering of	peaks.	An	
initial	variable	determines	to	what	extent	peaks	are	distributed	with-

















cannot	 perform	 that	 turn,	 they	 select	 a	 new	behaviour	with	 the	un-
available	behaviour	removed.	Let’s	examine	each	behaviour.





the	 total sharpness of	 their	 stack	of	evidence.	 In	 the	first	experiment,	
this	is	when	the	sum	of	the	evidence	sharpness	is	greater	than	three	
times	the	landscape’s	ceiling.	They	generate	and	exploit	twice	as	often	















(in 1st and 
2nd experi-
ment)
Obligate 1 / 11 4 / 11 4 / 11 2 / 11 Total 
evidence 
sharpness 
> 3x the 
ceiling
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Figure	1.	Snapshots	of	a	sample	simulation	run.	X-	and	Y-axes	
map	 to	 landscape	 coordinates,	 and	 colours	 represent	
height	(from	dark	blue,	which	is	lowest,	to	dark	red,	which	
is	highest).	The	locations	where	agents	exploit	are	marked	




4. Experiments: Topography & Strategy
The	literature	on	methodological	pluralism	implies	that	caring	about	
independence	or	sharpness	—	that	 is,	adopting	omnivore	or	obligate	













sum	of	 heights	 of	 all	 landscape	 coordinates)	 and	whether	 the	 land-
scape	 favours	obligate	or	omnivore	 strategies?	A	 circumstance	with	
bountiful,	 sharp	 evidence	 should	 encourage	 scientists	 to	 focus	 on	
sharpness.	When	evidence	is	duller,	a	strategy	of	focusing	on	variety-
of-evidence	reasoning	is	more	appropriate.	And	indeed,	in	our	model,	











exploit	 are	marked	with	 black	 dots	 and	 cluster	 around	 the	 highest	
peaks;	 locations	omnivores	exploit	 are	marked	with	white	dots	and	
tend	to	occur	on	the	periphery	of	the	landscape.





kept	 total	 abundance	 and	 landscape	 ceiling	 steady,26	 but	 varied	 the	
distribution	 of	 value	 across	 the	 landscapes.	We	 predicted	 that	 land-
scapes	with	 concentrated	 value	 at	 or	 near	 the	 centre	would	 favour	








at	 simulation	 end	 (after	 150	 steps),	 as	 a	 function	of	 total	
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of	 publishing	 for	 the	 various	 strategies	 (irrelevant	 of	 topography).	
Whether	bias	is	egregious,	indifferent,	or	positive	is	not	built	into	our	
model	—	this	depends	on	context	and	the	goals	at	hand.
Experiment 3: Method Bias
We	know	that	certain	 landscapes	 favour	certain	strategies:	clustered,	
abundant	 landscapes	 favour	obligates;	dispersed,	 sparse	 landscapes	
favour	omnivores.	Can	method	bias,	 here	 in	 its	 guise	of	 publishing	
standards,	 work	 against	 or	 mitigate	 the	 strategies	 favoured	 by	 the	
landscape?	 To	 answer	 this,	 we	 conducted	 a	 series	 of	 experiments	




































attempt	 to	 interfere	with	 the	 “natural”	 path	 of	 things.	On	 the	 other	




problematic	 for	our	purposes:	 “bias”	 is	 simply	 the	comparative	ease	



























a	 function	 of	 omnivore	 publication	 threshold	 on	 an	 obli-
gate-favouring	landscape.
This	graph	charts	omnivore	publishing	bias	on	the	horizontal	axis	(as	















tio,	 and	 total	 independence).	 Interestingly,	 the	 average	 amount	 still	
increases	—	although	not	enormously,	once	error	bars	are	taken	into	
account	—	once	the	bias	is	lowered	to	the	point	where,	in	the	previous	










of	 independence	 produced.	A	 tempting	 lesson	 to	 draw	 here	 is	 that	
publishing	bias	produces	more	diversity	when	favouring the mismatched 
than	when	disfavouring the matched. As	mentioned	above,	such	conclu-




could	 be	 tested:	 lowering	 evidential	 requirements	 for	 the	 method	
which	 is	 less	 effective	 in	 the	 evidential	 context	 (e.g.	 a	 variety-of-ev-
idence	 paper	 in	 a	 traditional	 experimental-sharpness-oriented	 disci-
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The	lesson,	we	take	it,	 is	that	although	there	are	costs	associated	
with	 publishing	 bias,	 these	 are	 neither	 simple	 nor	 fair.	 In	 our	mod-
el,	 at	 least,	 the	 introduction	of	bias	against	 the	grain	does	not	have	





Regardless,	 the	discrepancy	between	 increases	 in	one	value	and	de-
creases	in	the	other	are	suggestive.	If	this	trade-off	can	be	confirmed	









ing,	we	want	 to	make	 two	points.	 First,	we’ll	 consider	 the	potential	
downsides	of	method	bias	in	various	contexts.	Second,	we’ll	suggest	















Is	 the	 trade-off	 a	 fair	 one?	 That	 is,	when	we	 encourage	 the	mis-
matched	methodology,	do	we	discourage	the	other	in	equal	amounts?	







Neutral bias Omni bias (for) Obli bias (for)
Neutral 1,1 0.68,1.38 1.72,0.47
Omni-favouring 0.31,1.69 0.31,2.04 0.46,1.54
Obli-favouring 11.37,0.17 9.08,0.38 11.93,0.16
The	first	 value	 represents	 total	 sharpness,	 the	 second	 total	 indepen-
dence.	The	values	are	indexed	to	the	neutral	values.	So,	for	instance,	













	 adrian	currie	&	shahar	avin Method Pluralism, Method Mismatch, & Method Bias
philosophers’	imprint	 –		18		– vol.	19,	no.	13	(april	2019)
the	safe	confines	of	 the	 lab	(1993,	 1999,	2007).	The	hunt	 for	 “clinch-
ers”	leads	to	stable	results,	but	these	are	very	limited	in	their	applica-
tion.	Transporting	knowledge	 from	 laboratory	 settings	 into	 the	wild	






evidence	 in	 the	 new	 context.	 Under	 these	 conditions,	method	 bias	
could	 lead	us	to	both	 ignore	routes	 to	better	discoveries	and	to	mis-
judge	the	importance	and	reliability	of	the	information	we	do	have.
Knowledge Generation & Community Standards
A	further	consequence	of	our	discussion	of	method	plurality,	bias,	and	
mismatch	concerns	what	a	philosophical	account	of	scientific	knowl-
edge	 should	 be	 like.	 Philosophers	 have	 often	 approached	 scientific	
evidence	narrowly:	the	philosophical	task	vis-à-vis scientific	evidence	
requires	 understanding	 confirmation	—	that	 is,	 explaining	 the	 rela-
tionship	between	observations	and	hypotheses.	It	strikes	us	that	con-
sideration	of	method	bias	puts	pressure	on	such	narrow	conceptions.	










of	analysis	(as	Popper	argued	in	The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1934).	
The	logical	and	abstract	questions	of	justification	are	the	philosopher’s	
playground,	 while	 the	 messy,	 human	 side	 can	 be	 relegated	 to	 the	
vis-à-vis	 methodological	 pluralism.	Whether	 we	want to	 emphasize	










in	 circumstances	where	 scientific	 results	 are,	 as	 it	were,	 in	 the	 pub-
lic	eye:	when	they	matter	for	public	policy,	for	instance.	Preferring	a	
kind	of	evidence	which	is	inappropriate	to	context	could	result	in	mis-
management,	 and	misunderstanding	 the	 stability,	 accuracy,	 or	 trust-
worthiness	of	scientific	claims.	Our	technological	prowess	is	plausibly	
outpacing	our	 scientific	understanding,	and	 it	becomes	 increasingly	











Often,	 the	 more-or-less	 unambiguous	 results	 of	 methodological	
obligates	 are	 seen	 as	 the	 gold	 standard	 of	 scientific	 success,	 but	 in	




	 adrian	currie	&	shahar	avin Method Pluralism, Method Mismatch, & Method Bias
philosophers’	imprint	 –		19		– vol.	19,	no.	13	(april	2019)








dependence	 and	 sharpness,	 it	 doesn’t	 follow	 from	 this	 that	 the	ma-
chinery	captures	what	matters	about	sharpness	or	independence.	First,	
it	does	not	tell	us	under	what	epistemic	circumstances	sharpness	or	













Second,	 such	 a	 precisification	 cannot	 explain	 community	 stan-
dards	—	method	 biases	—	that	 shape	 how	 a	 scientific	 community	 be-
haves.	That	is,	in	addition	to	missing	epistemic	context,	they	also	can-




29.	Wallach	 (2016),	 for	 instance,	has	no	problem	fitting	diverse	archaeological	
evidence	into	a	Bayesian	framework.
dustbin	of	“discovery”.	As	such,	when	philosophers	consider	science,	

















Our	 critique	 is	 complementary:	 as	evidence	comes	 in	a	 range	of	
flavours,	and	(crucially)	 in	different	contexts	some	flavours	perform	




is	 like,	and	use	 these	 to	guide	how	the	community	develops,	under-
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